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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we introduce a new software concept specifically designed to allow the digital forensics 
professional to clearly identify and attribute instances of LSB image steganography by using the 
original cover image in side-by-side comparison with a suspected steganographic payload image. 
The "CounterSteg"software allows detailed analysis and comparison of both the original cover image 
and any modified image, using sophisticated bit- and color-channel visual depiction graphics. In 
certain cases, the steganographic software used for message transmission can be identified by the 
forensic analysis of LSB and other changes in the payload image. The paper demonstrates usage 
and typical forensic analysis with eight commonly available steganographic programs. Future work 
will attempt to automate the typical types of analysis and detection. This is important, as currently 
there is a steep rise in the use of image LSB steganographic techniques to hide the payload code 
used by malware and viruses, and for the purposes of data exfiltration. This results because of the 
fact that the hidden code and/ or data can more easily bypass virus and malware signature detection 
in such a manner as being surreptitiously hidden in an otherwise innocuous image file. 
Keywords: Steganography, steganalysis, digital forensics, malware, virus, LSB encoding. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Steganography use in malware and for covert 
communications is on the rise according to 
many computer security research organizations. 
Payload images can also bypass data 
exfiltration mechanisms with relative ease, as 
positive identification of message-carrying 
images is elusive. 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
2. STEGANOGRAPHY 
SCENARIOS 
Steganography has been successfully used for 
data exfiltration, espionage, concealed 
communications, command and control for 
botnets orchestration, malvertising, and 
ransomware propagation, among other covert 
and malicious applications. Below is a list of 
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examples of how steganography can typically 
operate in various application case scenarios 
(Gutub, Ankeer, Abu-Ghalioun, Shaheen, Alvi 
2008): 
An employee decides to steal sensitive 
proprietary files. With today's security 
systems, this would be noticed using 
classic approaches; however, using 
steganography, the sensitive files are 
encoded into images. By doing so, the 
images can be uploaded to social 
networks or cloud storage services 
without triggering red flags. 
A group of cybercriminals is attempting 
to communicate and synchronize attacks 
from different countries. Since they 
cannot go through standard 
communication channels, they decide to 
conceal secret messages into profile 
pictures of social accounts . In this way, 
they can communicate by uploading and 
downloading unsuspicious profile photos 
using whitelisted services. 
A massive botnet has been deployed and 
is awaiting instructions. Any attempt of 
communication from a central server to 
the bots is likely to be discovered 
eventually. Instead of using a server, the 
bots are configured to periodically 
download a feed of text and images from 
a public social network account. By 
decoding steganographic data from the 
feed, instructions are extracted and 
executed. 
A malicious campaign is planned to 
affect millions of users, but the 
perpetrators want to keep it as secret as 
possible. Since the goal is to exploit a 
browser vulnerability, they use 
steganography to conceal malicious code 
into advertisement images. To reach a 
large audience quickly, they submit the 
banner to networks that distribute the 
image over hundreds of websites. By 
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doing so the propagation is guaranteed 
and the campaign revenue can be larger. 
A new ransomware attack hides the 
communication between the victims and 
the perpetrator. Using steganography 
information harvested from the target 
system is encoded into pictures uploaded 
to an image hosting website. Using this 
tactic, the ransomware campaign 
deployment can remain hidden for a 
longer period of time. 
Tragically, all the examples stated above are 
based on actual malware case histories. 
Although many of these attacks were eventually 
identified and stopped, the amount of time and 
effort required to detect and stop steganography 
related attacks and communications was large 
and continues to be take enormous investigative 
resources and knowledge. The result is that 
steganography continues to be a very lucrative 
technique and opportunity for cybercriminals. 
2 .1 Rise in the Usage of 
Steg;anography for lv1alware 
Recently we have seen steganography used m 
the following malware programs and 
cyberespionage tools: 
Microcin, alias Six Little Monkeys; 
NetTraveler; 
Zberp; 
Enfal, which possesses a new loader 
called Zero. T; 
Shamoon; 
KinS; 
ZeusVM; 
Triton, alias Fibbit. 
Why are malware authors increasingly using 
steganography in their creations? There are 
three main reasons for this: 1. It helps them 
conceal not just the data itself but the fact that 
data is being uploaded and downloaded; 2. It 
helps bypass DPI systems, which is relevant for 
corporate systems; and 3. Use of steganography 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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may help bypass security checks by anti-APT 
products ( as the latter cannot process all image 
files as corporate networks contain too many of 
them, and common analysis algorithms are 
expensive computationally) (Priyanka, Sahoo 
2016; Chen, Huygens, Desmet, Joosen 2016; 
Daryabar, Dehghantanha, Broujerdi 2011) . 
It is confirmed that Steganography is also 
used by the malware Vawtrak, Zbot , Lurk, and 
Stegoloader. In early 2015, Vawtrak started 
using steganography to hide its settings in 
favicons. The malware downloads a favicon.ico 
file from a server hosted on TOR using the 
tor2web service. This favicon.ico image is the 
one displayed by browsers at the left side of a 
URL. Generally, each website contains a 
favicon.ico image, so security products seeing 
such requests would typically not test them for 
validity. Next, the malware extracts a least 
significant bit from each pixel and constructs a 
URL for downloading its configuration file 
(Wyke 2015; Pevny, Kopp, Kfoustek, Ker 2016). 
One variant of the Zbot malware also uses 
steganography to hide its configuration data. 
This variant downloads a JPEG on the victim's 
system. The configuration data hides inside this 
image. Later, the malware extracts the 
configuration data from the image and performs 
further malicious actions. 
The Lurk malware uses steganography to 
download other malware onto targeted systems. 
Instead of simply downloading and executing a 
malicious binary, Lurk first downloads a BMP 
image. It uses a least-significant-bit (LSB) 
algorithm to embed encrypted URLs into the 
image file. It then extracts the embedded URLs 
from the image file and then downloads 
additional malware. 
The Stegoloader malware installs malware 
on victims' systems to steal sensitive 
information. On successful execution, 
Stegoloader downloads a PNG image from a 
legitimate website. It uses steganography to 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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embed its main module's code inside the 
downloaded PNG. The malware retrieves the 
hidden data by applying a steganographic 
extraction algorithm (Bureau, Deitrich 2015). 
The recently discovered Stegano ( also 
known as Astrum) exploit kit, has been used in 
the past months as part of a very ingenious 
malvertising campaign. Stegano authors have 
operated by embedding malicious code inside 
the RGBA transparency value of each pixel of 
PNG banner ads. As users viewed the ads, 
JavaScript code would parse the PNG image, 
extract the malicious code and redirect the user 
to the exploit kit landing page, where he would 
be infected with various types of malware. 
Besides Stegano, the second exploit kit 
discovered in 2016 that heavily relies on 
steganography is named DNSChanger. The 
group behind DNSChanger created malicious 
ads that contained code that launched brute-
force attacks against the user's home WiFi 
router. Attackers were taking control over the 
victim's router, and injecting ads in all his web 
traffic. Once again, steganography was crucial 
to hide this malicious code inside the ads' 
images, which helped the cybercriminal authors 
hide the exploit kit's activity from security 
researchers. 
One of the major players operating in the 
exploit kit market has also turned its efforts to 
using steganography. The exploit kit's name is 
'Sundown,' an exploit kit developed a group of 
German-speaking developers who called 
themselves the "Yugoslav Business Network" (or 
YBN). 
Until recently, Sundown operators never 
bothered to mask exploit code delivered to user 
files . Security researchers looking at traffic logs 
could easily identify the Sundown exploit 
package by looking at URLs, which often 
contained files ending in ".SWF" or ".XAP" 
extensions, specific to Flash and Silverlight 
exploits. 
Page 163
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After a recent update, Sundown now hides 
these exploits as mundane ".PNG" files. The 
file's header says the file is a PNG image, but 
its content contains the actual exploit. Sundown 
traffic is now much harder to detect, and 
researchers have to put more work in unmasking 
Sundown operations, just as its operators 
wanted. 
This addition of steganography in Sundown 
operations was spotted recently and appears to 
have been inspired by previous three 
malvertising campaigns. The first is the massive 
AdGholas malvertising campaign, which ran on 
the Angler and Neutrino exploit kits , the second 
is the GooNky malvertising campaign, and the 
third is a malvertising campaign that delivered 
the CryLocker ransomware via the RIG exploit 
kit. 
In all cases, the cybercriminals behind these 
malvertising campaigns had used steganography 
to deliver PNG images to victims, which 
contained malicious code that scanned their 
computer, and later delivered downloaded 
malware. 
The most successful of the malware ad 
campaigns was the AdGholas campaign, which 
raged on undetected for almost a year ( Cabaj, 
Caviglione, Mazurczyk, Wendel, Woodward, 
Zander 2018). The success of those campaigns 
has apparently convinced the Sundown 
organization to run many steganography 
experiments of their own. 
By disguising malicious content as PNG 
files, Sundown is now following the new trend 
that has slowly taken hold of the exploit kit 
market in the past year. It is estimated that it 
will continue to use steganography, at least until 
security firms find a way to quickly identify 
malicious PNG files and block them. 
Data exfiltration, also known as 'data theft,' 
is the unauthorized transfer of sensitive 
information from a computer or a server. In 
2016, there were attacks related to Magento, an 
Page 164 
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online e-commerce platform. The attacks used 
image steganography to hide payment card 
details. After execution, the malicious code 
collected the payment card details and hid this 
inside a local image file, such as an actual 
product picture. Once data collection was 
completed, the attacker then downloaded the 
image file ( typical for an e-commerce website) 
and extracted the hidden data (Melanson 2017). 
These trends described above in particular 
suggest that malware writers are on the verge of 
adopting steganography on a mass scale. Most 
modern anti-malware solutions provide little, if 
any, protection from steganography. As a result, 
any steganographic carrier file such as a digital 
image or even a video file, that can be used to 
conceal stolen data, or communications between 
a malware program and a command and control 
server, will remain undetected. 
2. 2 hnproved Det.ection 
Procedures and Techniques 
Many statistical techniques have been 
developed over the years to attribute a 
probability of a file being a steganographic cover 
file, but owing to the various methodologies and 
data payload densities, these methods can be 
considered unreliable at best. In certain cases, 
regarding digital image steganography, it may 
be possible to visually or algorithmically 
determine the original image. This would be the 
image file before payload injection takes place. 
Normally, image steganography will involve 
altering the least significant bits (LSBs) in the 
cover image. By comparing the original image 
LSBs to the payload image LSBs, a positive 
identification cannot take place indicating the 
use of steganography. In performing 
steganalysis, possessing the payload image file 
alone leaves little option than the use of 
statistically based probabilistic tools for 
attribution (Walia, Jain, Navdeep 2010). 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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However, by locating the original digital 
image file for comparison, the alteration of LSBs 
alone is quite the forensic "smoking gun," so to 
speak, for reliable attribution for the use of 
steganography software to send messages or 
data files. This could be a starting point for 
further investigation for law enforcement or 
other investigative authorities. 
In performing good steganographic 
procedure, a suspect will take care to data wipe 
any original cover file, to prevent such a 
comparison from taking place. However, in 
practice, human error and technical limitations 
may prevent completely effective data erasure 
of the original cover image. In that light, we 
recommend an active search for the original 
image if suspicion of steganographic usage 
exists. There are many possibilities for locating 
the original image that will allow later positive 
attribution for the use of steganography. The 
following lists many examples of the large 
number of potential locations to find an original 
image for comparison. 
Places to find non-payload (also known as a 
"cover") image: 
1. Suspect hard drive filesystems 
2. Suspect removable USB drives 
3. Suspect cameras and mobile devices 
4. Suspect CDs and DVDs 
5. Local email inboxes/ outboxes 
6. Cloud email inboxes/ outboxes 
7. Recent web search and browser histories 
8. Google image searches 
9. Network attached storage devices 
10. Employment computers and networks 
11. Recycle bins 
12. Deleted files removed from recycle bins 
13. Online photo galleries 
14. Personal and business associates' files as 
listed above 
Any image presenting the same visual 
appearance and pixel dimensions is an excellent 
candidate to be the original cover image file. In 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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that light we offer novel digital forensics 
software to allow the investigator to perform a 
quick and more convenient LSB analysis in 
comparison to make a positive identification. 
Further, the LSB comparison image results can 
be conveniently copied and pasted for reports 
documents for conclusive proof of the use of 
steganography. 
3. THE 
"CO UNTERSTEG" 
SOFTWARE 
The software introduced with this paper, 
CounterSteg, is available free of charge from the 
following website: 
http: //199.l 75.52.196/ CounterSteg/ . This 
Windows-based software allows the loading of 
two images and comparison of pixel color bits in 
the LSB plane. The software will also run under 
Linux with Wine installed. Detailed analysis is 
performed visually at the moment; however, we 
envision future algorithms which can automate 
the results conclusion positively. The software 
can be used to detect differences between 
original and payload image. Positive detection 
implies, in general, identical pixel dimensions 
and most pixels identical except for various LSB 
values. Human forensic analysis does confirm 
final analysis using additional informed 
investigation techniques described in this paper. 
3.1 Reconnnended Usage 
If a suspect image is detected, a search should 
be conducted for visually similar and pixel 
dimensionally identical images in the locations 
listed above , among others. Once potential 
matches are identified, the software should be 
used to look for differences in the LSB and 
perhaps nearby planes. If such differences are 
detected, it can be considered positive 
identification for the use of steganography, 
although it is unlikely the original message or 
data can be recovered, except with the 
cooperation of the suspect, or acquisition of the 
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original software and/ or encryption key used to 
embed the data; however, with positive results 
in hand, this further investigation or warrant 
acquisition can be embarked upon with great 
confidence. 
3. 2 Results Using Various 
Steg;anographic Programs for 
Experimentation and Analysis 
The following are the results of steganography 
analysis and detection with commonly available 
tools that may be used by a cybercriminal, or 
other suspect, free of charge. These programs 
include: 
OpenPuff 
http: //embeddedsw.net / OpenPuff _Ste 
ganography _ Home.html 
Steganography Online 
http: / / stylesuxx.github.io/ steganograp 
hy/ 
Geocaching Toolbox 
https: //www.geocachingtoolbox.com/ in 
dex. php ?page= steganography 
OTP-Steg 
http: //www.mauisolarsoftware.com/ OT 
P-Steg/ 
f5stego.js 
http: //desudesutalk.github.io/ f5stegojs 
I 
Dev FarmSteganography 
https: / / devfarm.it / steganography / 
StegoShare 
http: / / stegoshare.sourceforge.net/ 
BitCrypt http: / / bitcrypt.moshe-
szweizer. com/ 
OpenStego 
https: / / www.openstego.com/ index.html 
Other programs unable to be tested at 
this time were: 
Steghide 
http: //steghide.sourceforge.net / downlo 
ad.php 
Page 166 
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SteganPEG 
http: //download.cnet.com/ SteganPEG 
/ 3000-2193 _ 4-75914262.html 
ManyTools Steganography 
https: / / manytools.org/ hacker-
tools / steganography-encode-text-into-
image / 
Steganographic Encoder ( Steghide) -
https: / / futureboy.us/ stegano/ encinput. 
html 
Mobilefish 
https: / / www.mobilefish.com/ services/ st 
eganography / steganography. php 
Kwebbel 
http: //www.kwebbel.net/ stega/ enindex 
.php 
The authors will attempt tests with 
untested and additional tools soon. 
As examples of the type of forensic 
steganalysis that can be conducted with 
CounterSteg, we have embedded text data into 
a standard cover image using some of the above 
listed and easily available steganographic 
programs. Each of these programs was accessed 
directly from a website or downloaded 
executable. Each took less than 10-20 minutes 
to use to embed the standard text data into the 
standard cover image, which is shown on the 
next page in Figure 1. 
The standard cover image shown below was 
taken by one of the authors in Keyser, West 
Virginia in the Fall of 2015, using a Nikon D90 
digital camera. This image shows a fairly even 
distribution of red, green, and blue colors 
throughout the image, except for the center top 
open to the sky. In this specific area, the camera 
CMOS sensor saturated to white 
(RGB[255,255,255]), and each of the pixels here 
represents that single saturated white color. 
This is notable for LSB steganography in that 
steganographic programs that modify pixels in 
this area will be more easily statistically 
detected. Alterations to the LSB values in pixels 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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in solid color, or saturated, portions of the image 
are a good indicator of nonstandard 
modifications ( such as steganography) . Good 
CDFSL Proceedings 2018 
steganographic programs will attempt to avoid 
modifications to these specific areas, among 
others. 
Figure 1. Cover image taken with Nikon D90 camera. 
The standard text embedded in the image 
was the President Kennedy inauguration 
speech, which is 1,366 words, and 7,512 
characters. The size of the text is 7.38 KB (7,566 
bytes) , file size on disk was 8.00 KB (8,192 
bytes). Kennedy's inauguration speech was 
delivered on January 20, 1961. 
The CounterSteg program produces detailed 
visual analysis and comparison of digital images, 
specifically in each color and bit-plane, in 
addition to combinations of colors in a 
particular bit-plane. The figure below shows 
that the image analysis window, which 
calculates results for 45 various bit plane and 
color combinations. The Alpha channel is the 
transparency channel and remains on unused in 
many images. 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
Surprisingly, however, some steganographic 
programs make spurious or data-carrying 
modifications in the alpha channel, so it is 
important to also keep an investigative eye on 
this color channel. In the analysis window 
shown below, each color channel is broken down 
by bits, with bit 0 corresponding to the LSB, 
and bit 7 corresponding to the MSB. The values 
in each bit plane are shown for red, green, and 
blue channels, as well as the alpha channel. For 
the graphic shown for II All Bits, 11 the pixel color 
here will be non-black if any of the bi ts ( 0-7) is 
set to a nonzero. The color value is the relative 
intensity of that color ( red, green, or blue) in 
the range of 0 to 255. 
Finally, the image shown in the grid in the 
upper-left for "All Bits" and "All Colors" is 
basically the original image, since it shows the 
combined color values in all channels and all 
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bits. Any of the images shown in the grid can 
be clicked on to bring up a new window showing 
that image full-size. This can be copied and 
pasted into an image editing program for further 
analysis or the saving of the image. 
The overall idea and philosophy of the 
CounterSteg steganalysis software is to allow 
the convenient analysis and comparison of 
before and after images to look for the telltale 
traces of steganographic software activity and 
modifications. In many cases, these follow 
similar patterns, and the forensic analysis 
conducted can make informed conclusions based 
on typical similar patterns from the various 
categories of steganographic software currently 
available . The software available generally falls 
into several categories, which for the purposes 
of this paper we will categorize as: 3. the good, 
2. the bad, and 1. the ugly. 
We will start showing telltale traces from 
"ugly" steganographic software, typically this 
Positive Identification of LSB Image ... 
quality of software can be easily detected even 
without the original cover image for comparison. 
Even in the case of good steganographic 
software, having the original cover image on 
hand makes positive identification of the 
activity highly probable. 
The cover image analysis window shown 
below clearly depicts the area of white 
saturation in the upper center of the image ( the 
area open to the sky through the trees). Other 
color and blue channels show a reasonable 
distribution of intensities throughout most areas 
of the image. Ideally, for steganographic 
activities, areas of solid colors, saturation, and 
low noise between colors and shades should be 
avoided. This is to circumvent statistical 
analysis of the steganographic payload carrying 
image that may indicate a high probability of 
data carrying modifications. 
. Image Analysl• C I_ Coun1orS1ogllmagoTooi.lDSC2oe8_Conrlmago png ' 
All 
Col.Of"• 
All Bits 7 6 
Figure 2. Analysis of cover image. 
5 
Clicking on the LSB (bit 0) image for all 
colors, the image below is brought up and is 
shown as Figure 3. This image shows the bits 
colored for whether red, green, or blue pixel 
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LSBs are sent to O or 1. Various color shades are 
shown depending on multiple values, however if 
only one bit is set, such as red, the pixel will 
remain red as shown in the red bit O color image 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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shown as part of Figure 1. Using the LSB image 
can give an idea of the relative distribution of 
LSB values in the image in various colors. In 
general, for many photographs, the distribution 
will be largely random except for saturated or 
Figure 3. LSB values analysis of cover image 
Also contained within the CounterSteg is the 
ability to visually show pixel variations between 
colors in a local area. Below, in Figure 4 is an 
image that shows the variation in the green 
color channel. Areas of lighter colors indicate 
higher variation ( which could be considered 
noise) between pixel colors in nearby areas of 
the image. Since the area of the sky is black -
this indicates no variation and LSB, or other bit 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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solid color areas of the image. This image is the 
starting point for our further analysis, as 
modifications to the LSB bit plane are 
particularly evident in certain qualities of 
steganographic software available. 
planes - modifications will be more easily 
statistically detectable here. 
The figure below depicts the green color 
channel variation using all bits. Variation is 
based on the calculation of peak signal to noise 
ratio (PSNR) of each pixel green color versus its 
neighbors. 
Page 169
  
 
CDFSL Proceedings 2018 Positive Identification of LSB Image ... 
. 
'#; · : 
Figure 4. Pixel green color varia tion throughout the cover image. 
In addition to CounterSteg providing bit by 
bit and color analysis for a single image, the 
software also allows image comparisons using a 
similar breakdown. The comparison of the 
original cover image to a contrast adjusted 
image is shown below. In this breakdown, only 
differences between pixels, colors, and bits are 
shown. Below each comparison image is shown 
the total number of bit , color, and/ or pixel 
differences ( depending on the analysis), as well 
as the percentage of changes relative to the total 
number of changes possible. 
This analysis window allows quick and 
convenient comparison between an assumed 
original cover image, and the assumed 
steganographic payload image. The specific 
type, location, and scale of the differences can 
help to clearly identify steganographic activities 
Page 170 
that have been performed on the image, the 
likely image payload size, and perhaps even the 
likely specific steganographic software that has 
been used in certain cases. In the following 
narrative, we will detail forensic profiles of 
various software packages and their results. 
3. 3 Cbntrast Adjustment 
As an example of a standard image adjustment 
in comparison, below is the results of comparing 
the original cover image to a modified image 
with a small contrast adjustment. In addition to 
large modifications in the LSB plane we are also 
seeing large to small modifications in all other 
bit planes, and in all colors. In general, if two 
visually similar versions of an image exist -
seeing changes like this in comparison would 
generally not indicate steganographic activities . 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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.... C :\_ CounterSteg\lmageTests\DSC2068_Coverlmage png [vs] C:\_ CounterSteg\lmage 
All 
Colors 
Rod 
Green 
Blue 
Alpha 
All Bits 7 6 4 3 
Figure 5. Comparison of cover image to contrast adjusted image. 
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3.4 Brightness Adjustment 
Similar to the small contrast adjustment, a 
brightness adjustment of the original image 
results in a comparison profile showing large 
modifications in all colors and in all bit planes. 
. C I CountorStoollmageTo•~IOSC2068_Covcrlmage.png l••J C:LCouni.rS119~eTHUIO B 
All 
Color• 
.... 
GrMn 
llwe 
Alpl,a 
All Bits 7 6 s 4 3 
Figure 6. Comparison of cover image to brightness adjusted image. 
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3 .5 Gamma Adjustment 
The Gamma adjustment color filter compresses 
or stretches various colors and would result in a 
comparison profile similar to the one shown 
below. All colors and all bit planes are greatly 
modified. The differences between the two 
images will be visually apparent. 
In conclusion, standard image filters , such 
as those found in Photoshop, or other image 
Positive Identification of LSB Image ... 
editing software, for contrast , brightness, and 
gamma adjustment, do not generally yield 
comparison results similar to what we will 
depict in the following narrative for 
steganographic related changes. This is with one 
exception, BitCrypt, which should still be 
detectable using other digital forensic clues and 
analysis. 
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Figure 7. Comparison of cover image to gamma adjusted image. 
For the purposes of this paper and analysis, 
we will divide steganographic software into 
three general categories ranging from the ugly 
to the good and including the bad in between. 
Each software embeds a digital payload with 
varying levels of detectable qualities. The ugly 
is the worst, and should result in the easiest 
forensic detections, even without possessing the 
original cover image. In the case of good 
software, embedded data will be virtually 
undetectable without the original cover image 
for comparison. 
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However, in the case of good software, with 
the cover image original on hand, a forensic bit 
plane comparison makes the activity even then 
easily evident. This is in comparison to typical 
image changes shown from standard image 
filters, such as contrast, brightness, and gamma 
adjustment , explained previously. Possession of 
the original cover image makes positive 
identification and attribution possible in almost 
all circumstances. 
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4. THE UGLY 
Typically, ugly software takes a "let it rip" 
attitude and just shoves the data to be 
embedded into the LSB image color plane, 
without regard to how easily this would be 
possibly detected using a forensic analysis. 
4 .1 St.eg;anography Online 
http: / / stylesuxx.github.io/ steganography / 
CDFSL Proceedings 2018 
This particular software apparently first 
completely zeroes out the LSB bit plane in all 
colors, and then encodes the data into a narrow 
strip at the top of the image. This is visually 
evident in the analysis image shown below -
where all LSB bits are simply set to zero, except 
for the data at the top. This is the least 
sophisticated and most na:ive of all the 
steganographic software we will be analyzing -
the ugly . 
. lrru1go AnaJys,• C I_ CountorStog\lrugoTo:rt"1t>SC20e8_Stooanograpl1y0nllno P"9 
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Fiqure 8 Analysis of image created bv Steganographv Online 
In the comparison image shown below, you 
can see all bit planes are identical from bit plane 
7 to 1. All modifications take place in bit plane 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
0 (LSB), which is in fact first set to zero, and 
then the data is encoded. 
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Figure 9. Comparison of cover image to image created by Steganography Online. 
The image shown below is an expansion of 
all colors in bit plane 0, the data containing 
strip at the top is easily evident. In particular, 
the area of saturated white pixels at the top is 
completely overwritten. This software will be 
easily forensically detectable and identifiable in 
usage. 
Figure 10. LSB values of Steganography Online image 
Page 174 @ 2018 ADFSL 
  
 
.
 
Positive Identification of LSB Image ... 
4. 2 Stego.Share 
http: / / stegoshare.sourceforge.net / 
The next ugliest software uses a similar 
approach; however, does not completely zero 
out the LSB plane. In addition, it makes 
modifications to bit plane 1 and 2, for reasons 
CDFSL Proceedings 2018 
unknown. Other bit planes remain unchanged. 
Further, some type of narrow strip of 
information is embedded in the top center of the 
image. Analyzing the image in bit planes 0, 1, 
and 2, as shown below, clearly depicts the 
modifications. 
, lm•go AnaJy.,, C I_ CountorS1ogllmag1Tosto\OSC2oe8_S1190Sl,art png 
All Bits 7 6 
Figure 11. StegoShare image analysis 
In comparing the images, you can see the 
large percentage ( 33-50%) of modifications 
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made to bit plane 0, 1, and 2, with the exception 
of green in bit plane 2. 
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Figure 12. Ste)l;oShare ima)l;e comparison 
5 
The expansion of the changes to all colors in 
all bit planes image shown below shows the 
narrow strip of information also embedded into 
Fiaure 13. StegoShare LSB values. 
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the top center of the image. This is shown m 
Figure 13 that follows. 
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4. 3 Geocaching Toolbox 
https: //www.geocachingtoolbox.com/ index.php 
?page= steganography 
This software only alters the LSB bit plane 
in all three colors; however, it includes all the 
data into a narrow strip at the bottom of the 
image. This would be easily detectable using RS 
CDFSL Proceedings 2018 
statistical analysis as changes to the bit patterns 
in only a small fraction of the image ( the portion 
containing the data). The overall analysis of the 
image, as shown below in Figure 14, does not 
indicate much forensically. In this case, we also 
need the original cover image for comparison, 
which then makes the positive conclusion 
evident. 
, Image Analy1;10 C \~ CountorStogllmag1T1•talDSC2oe8_Geoc:a.c:hlngToolbo'l,.PnQ 
All Bits 7 6 s 
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Fiqure 14. Geocaching Toolbox image analysis. 
Below in Figure 15 is the comparison image, 
showing the data payload embedded to the 
narrow strip in the bottom of the image. 
However, due to the small amount of pixel 
changes (1 % ) , it is likely at least the software 
compresses the data before embedding. 
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Compressing the text data before embedding 
typically can reduce the size of the necessary 
modifications to the image by 80 to 90%. As a 
result, higher quality steganographic software 
will always compress data before engaging in the 
image embedding process. 
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Fiaure 15. Geocachine: Toolbox image comoarison. 
The narrow strip is clearly visible in Figure 
16 at the bottom. 
Figure 16. Geocaching Toolbox LSB changes. 
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4 .4 DevFarmSteg;an.ogra.phy 
https: / / devfarm.it / steganography / 
This software is comparable to the previous 
software, Geocaching Toolbox, and may make 
. lm•gc Analy$l• C I_ CountcrStog\lmag1THlll\DSC2oe8_01vF.rm p,,g 
All 
Colo'"'• 
11 ... 
All Bits 7 6 5 
Figure 17. DevFarm Steganography image analysis. 
CDFSL Proceedings 2018 
use of the same steganographic embedding 
libraries. The modifications to the image are 
very similar , with only slight differences in the 
number of pixels modified. 
~~ 
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--- -----
v C \_Co untorS!og\lmagcTooto\OSC206S_C<>wrlmago,png l_.l C;LCo-untcrStog~m•,111TutslOSC2068 0., pn 
AU 
Co,lor• 
.... 
llwe 
Alph• 
All Bits 7 6 4 
Figure 18. DevFarm Steganography image comparison 
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Fiaure 1.9. DevFarm Stee:anoe:raohv LSB imae:e chane:es 
5. THEBAD 
The best software is an improvement over the 
ugly, at least narrow strips of pixels are not 
apparently encoded (and more easily detected) , 
however security shortcomings are still evident. 
5.1 f5stegoJs 
http: //desudesutalk.github.io/ f5stegojs / 
This software seems to take the unique 
approach of ignoring the LSB and simply 
Page 180 
encoding data depending whether color values 
are odd or even. Even though many of the pixel 
colors are modified through multiple bit planes, 
some of the color values remain unchanged. This 
is evident in the comparison image of all bits in 
all colors shown as Figure 21. 
An analysis of the image shown in Figure 20 
does not show undue pixel modifications or 
strips; however, due to the large amount of color 
changes, visual differences will be evident 
between the original and modified image. 
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Figure 20. f5stegojs image analysis 
Below, in Figure 21, is the comparison 
analysis . Notice that all bit planes and all colors 
are modified. On first analysis, this would 
appear to be very similar to the contrast 
adjustment shown previously, however in that 
case virtually all pixels are modified, except for 
the saturated white area. In this case, many 
pixels remain unchanged, hinting at the 
possibility of "all bit 11 encoding. In other words, 
data is encoded by overall color intensity value 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
CDFSL Proceedings 2018 
4 2 1 6 
for the respective color channel, red, blue, or 
green (in the range O to 255). Depending on 
whether the color intensity is odd or even, this 
indicates the value of the bit for that particular 
color channel. Three bits can be encoded for 
each pixel in this fashion; however, forensic 
analysis of the steganographic image easily 
identifies a payload because of the fact that only 
selective pixels are modified. 
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Figure 21. f5stego_is image changes 
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As shown below in Figure 22 in the 
expansion of the comparison image in all color 
LSB bits - many pixels remain unchanged in 
an apparent random fashion. It is likely 
saturated pixels are avoided ( an aspect of 
Figure 22. f5stegojs LSB image changes. 
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quality in this software), and random noise is 
added in areas of the image not needed for 
further data encoding. Overall, 69% of the pixel 
color values in this image have been modified. 
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5. 2 BitCcypt 
http: / / bitcrypt.moshe-szweizer.com/ 
BitCrypt fails in the area of modifying 
saturated white pixels and makes this software 
more easily detectable. The sophisticated 
forensic analyst will be aware that camera 
CMOS sensors typically saturate to maximum 
values in bright areas, such as the sky, will not 
vary between colors pixel to pixel. These block 
, Imago Analyl;io C \~CountcrStogllmageTeotslDSC2oe8_BitCrypt bmp 
AU 
c.1 ..... 
Al""• 
All Bits 6 
Fiqure 23. BitCrypt image analysis 
Comparison with the cover image shows the 
broad modification of pixel colors in bits 0 
through 7; however, the area of saturation is 
avoided above bit 1. This most likely is a 
software coding implementation to create a 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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areas will be fully saturated and will remain so 
through the area of the similar object, such as 
the overcast sky. Modifications to pixels in these 
areas will be telltale signs for software image 
message or data carrying modifications. 
An overall analysis of the image shows the 
bit O and 1 modifications in the area of 
saturation. Bits 2-7 appear to be largely 
unchanged in the area of saturation. 
4 3 2 1 e 
similarity with a standard image processing 
function, such as brightness, contrast, or gamma 
adjustment; however, in those cases, the 
changes in the saturated area will propagate up 
through bit 7, and including bit 7. 
Page 183
 
 . 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
CDFSL Proceedings 2018 Positive Identification of LSB Image ... 
, C I _Coun'8rStegllmagcTc:.t>IOSC2068_Cove,lmag1 png lvt) C.L Co,,nwrSt.g111NQ1TnulOSCZOl8 
All 
Color• 
Gr •• ., 
llw• 
.Upl,a 
All Bi ts 7 6 
Figure 24. BitCrypt image comparison 
Further, the expansion of the bit O in all 
colors graphic analysis depicts the seemingly 
random dispersal of LSB bit changes, except for 
the relative lack of changes in the saturated 
area. This particular forensic pattern for 
steganographic activity is indeed unique. While 
subtly different from standard image processing 
Figure 25. BitCrypt LSB image changes 
Page 184 
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comparison results, the bit modification pattern 
should still be able to be classified and 
identifiable. Further test images should be 
created, and comparisons conducted in the 
future to analyze and identify with further 
clarity the modifications BitCrypt makes to 
images. 
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5. 3 OpenPuff 
http: //embeddedsw.net/ OpenPuff _Steganogra 
phy _ Home.html 
While completely avoiding the saturated 
pixel area, which is good, OpenPuff attempts to 
modify far too many pixels to not be detectable 
especially with a comparison image in hand. The 
software only modifies pixels in the LSB plane, 
making it virtually undetectable visually. 
However, overall 12% of the pixels are modified 
. Image Analyt;G C I_CounterStogllmageTestalOSC20eS_OpenPurf png 
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Figure 26. OpenPuff image analysis 
As shown below in Figure 27, OpenPuff only 
makes changes to the LSB values in the image 
but does these to far too great an extent at 12%. 
This leaves the payload image vulnerable to 
statistical analysis techniques. With a 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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in the image - compare this to 1 % even with 
less sophisticated programs. Statistical analysis 
of the image will reveal changes to typical 
photograph LSB bit patterns in typical similar 
photos with similar CMOS sensors. 
Overall analysis of the image, as shown 
below in Figure 26, does not reveal any 
particular fine points for analysis - making 
OpenPuff the best of the bad software for 
Steganography in this paper analysis. 
4 2 1 e 
comparison image m hand, since only LSB 
values are modified, it is highly probable to 
conclude steganographic payload has been 
embedded into the image. 
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Figure 27. OpenPuff image comparison 
Further, as shown below in Figure 28, the 
software takes care to avoid saturated color 
pixel areas . This is commendable; however, 
without exception, all other areas of the image 
Figure 28. OpenPuff LSB image changes 
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are highly modified, possibly with random data. 
This apparently random data will be more 
apparent to sophisticated image forensic 
analysis techniques. 
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6. THE GOOD 
The good steganographic software available in 
general attempts to do several things. It creates 
a low payload profile, in our examples below 1 % 
of the pixel values only of the image are 
modified. This compares to the 12% to 83% of 
the pixels modified by the other software 
analyzed previously. Less modifications will 
correspond to and equal less detectability. Also, 
it is important to disperse the changes into 
various areas of the image, specifically areas of 
higher noise and color variation. Areas of solid 
colors or pixel saturation should be actively and 
strongly avoided to lower the possibility and 
probability of forensic detectability. 
CDFSL Proceedings 2018 
6.1 OpenStego 
https: //www.openstego.com/ index.html 
OpenStego takes care to compress the data 
before embedding, reducing the overall payload 
size to about 1 % of the image pixels. Also, it 
disperses the data encoding seemingly randomly 
throughout the image. 
The overall image analysis shown below in 
Figure 29 provides little for further examination 
if only the payload image exists. It is likely any 
known statistical analysis technique will fall flat 
and fail when trying to determine if any data 
modifications have been performed on the 
existing image in hand. 
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Figure 29. OpenStego image analysis 
6 
The comparison analysis window shown 
below in Figure 30 indicates only LSB values 
have been modified, in all three-color channels. 
The color channels share equally with 
modifications, at about 1 % each. OpenStego, 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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therefore, is not taking into account relative 
individual color variations when deciding where 
to embed data values in various color channels. 
No modifications are made to the alpha 
(transparency) color channel. 
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Figure 30. OpenStego image comparison 
Below in Figure 31 are shown the LSB 
modifications in each color channel. Apparently, 
this is a random distribution not taking into 
account color variations throughout the image 
Figure 31 . OpenStego LSB image changes 
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as previously mentioned. Also, the software does 
not apparently take into consideration noise 
levels or saturation levels as well when encoding 
data. 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
  
 
 . 
 
Positive Identification of LSB Image ... 
6.2 6.2 OTP-Steg 
http: //www.mauisolarsoftware.com/ OTP-
Steg/ 
OTP-Steg receives its name from one-time 
pad encryption, which is used for encrypting the 
data in this software before compression and 
encoding of the data. OTP-Steg uses the zlib 
library to compress all data heavily before 
encoding. Further, the encoding process looks 
for and avoids saturated color or solid color 
, Imago An;iJyo15 C I_ CountcrStog'>lm•goTHtolOSC2008_0TP-Sloil png 
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Figure 32. OTP-Steg image analysis 
The comparison to the cover image window 
shown below in Figure 33 indicates only 1 % of 
the LSB values have been modified. Notice this 
also in fact varies significantly between color 
channel, with the red color channel carrying 
more than double the respective payloads of the 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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areas of the image. It conducts a noise and 
variation color analysis of the entire image, to 
prioritize encoding of LSB data into less 
statistically detectable areas. 
Overall payload image analysis, shown 
below in Figure 32, shows no features different 
from a standard photograph in all bit planes. 
Also, the payload image will be visually 
indistinguishable from the cover image, as only 
LSB values are modified. 
4 2 l e 
green and blue channels. This is because red 
color variation varies much more significantly 
through the image than the green and blue color 
variations. Thus, data carried in the red channel 
will be much harder to detect statistically. 
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Figure 33. OTP-Steg image comparison 
Shown below in Figure 34 is the image of 
the specific LSB values changed, in the three 
visible colors. Changes are dispersed randomly 
throughout the image, with respect to noise 
variation. The saturated sky area is completely 
avoided. Noticeably, red is much more heavily 
Figure 34, OTP-Steg LSB image changes 
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encoded into the blue and green. This image has 
a much stronger red component than the other 
two colors. However, where blue or green are 
dominant, that is the color encoded into them 
that respective area. Only one-color channel bit 
per pixel is allowed to be modified. 
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7. SIIMILAR IlVlAGE 
SEARCH 
To aid in locating images for further 
investigation, the CounterSteg software includes 
facilities for similar image searching on all 
, Seruth far ima.ges s.lr.1lta.r In the MSS bl~ eolor p{ane (85% Of grNtei] 
Wf1'tldcr 
,.. ... 
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machine drives and directories. The similar 
image search will identify images of identical 
pixel dimensions and most significant bit values. 
The value for search of most significant bit 
similarity percentage is software selectable. The 
search window design is shown below as Figure 
35. 
Star-Ch (Nttt I I 
Fiqure 35. Similar image search (similar in MSB values) .
8. FUTURE WORK 
We hope to automate the positive identification 
using image LSB comparison in the future by 
developing algorithms to conduct analyses. 
Most likely this will be based on a statistical 
measure of similarity between pixel color bits 
above the LSB plane, and difference measures 
in the LSB plane. In other words, primarily the 
LSB bits are altered between the image files, 
preserving the visual appearance, but only 
altering the data carrying LSB values. 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
Having such an automated algorithm in 
hand will greatly assist with the current 
phenomenon of malware making use of 
steganography to exfiltrate user and corporate 
data, such as credit cards, through detection 
systems designed to thwart such illicit 
transmissions. The detection system we envision 
would be based upon "caching" previously 
known images and comparing transmitted 
images to ones found in the cache database. 
Further, web image searches could be conducted 
by the system to check against images currently 
in transit. Detection of payload carrying images 
Page 191
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could create a red flag to alert security staff to 
the fact that data exfiltration may be taking 
place, or that a malware infestation is receiving 
command and control messages through 
payload carrying images. 
Also, it may be possible to automate part of 
the process for similar image searching and 
retrieval using the Google custom search API 
facilities. 
9. CONCLUSION 
Positively detecting the use of steganography in 
digital image files generally results in an 
unreliable and inconclusive effort. At least by 
attempting to actively recover the original 
image, before pixel bit alteration, is estimated 
to make this procedure much more reliable for 
positive identification by providing investigative 
software to allow such a comparison efficiently. 
Instead of performing statistical analysis to 
overall produce dubious results, if 
steganography is suspected, we posit the 
investigator would be more effective in simply 
looking for the original image file for 
comparison. With comparison software in place, 
the investigator can assign virtually conclusive 
attribution. This can be immediately obtained 
as shown in the numerous examples previously 
presented in this paper, and useful as evidence 
in legal proceedings or requests for initial or 
additional warrants. 
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